These fleet submarines, the first in the US Navy, had many innovative features but they were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. The rationale for them came from a vocal pre- lobby that saw large submarines as replacements for destroyers screening the battle fleet. They bear superficial comparison with the Royal Navy's K class (see page 84), but lacked sufficient surface speed to operate with the Fleet. Nor did anyone seem to be ae of just how limited the visi­bility was from the conning tower; for the same reason, submarine gunnery was a very crude affair. Without even the crudest fire control, submarine gunfire was useful only at short range against very 'soft' targets. They were very complex, slow to dive and hard to handle.

By the time the AA boats came into service the US Navy had gained some limited experi­ence operating in small numbers in the European theatre. But this was in highly specialised anti­submarine fare, like their British allies; by 1918 any chance of a fleet action was so remote that they would have had nothing to do.

The US Navy did not lose interest in fleet tactics for submarines, largely because the linu­tadons of the AA class were not yet known when nine more fleet types were authorised from 1921 onds and laid down in 1921-34. The first three V-1 class, more often known as the B class, were authorised in 1916 as SF-4 to SF-6, but were renumbered SS-163 to SS-1 65 in 1920, when a standard hull-numbering system was introduced.

The first three, h 1, V-2 and V-3, were given the names Barracuda (SS-163), Bass (SS-l64) and Bonita (SS-165) in February 1931.'hhe preliminary design work was done by the Navy's Bureau of Construction & Repair, and details were worked out by the builder, Portsmouth Navy Yard. They had a riveted partial double hull, subdivided into nine watertight compart­ments. The partial double hull featured a complex arrangement of tanks, and a non-circular cross-section that was different in every compartment. Other unusual features included a complex single-casting hatch structure containing both access for loading torpedoes and the escape trunk.A very unorthodox bow-shape was adopted, but it made the boat plough into the waves rather than riding them, despite the provision of two buoyancy tanks in the bow. The bridge was made taller than in previous designs, to improve visibility when running on the surface.

The designed speeds, 18.7kts surfaced and 9kts submerged, were more realistic than those of theAA class. Endurance was traded off against speed, resulting in 6000 rim (normal) and 10,000 nm (maximum at I lkts): submerged endurance was 10 hours at 5kts. The propulsion plant featured direct drive as well as diesel-electric drive; it was the precursor of all-electric drive, in which diesel generators provided current for the electric motors. However, both main diesels and electric urotors were a constant source of trouble.No tears were shed when the three boats were laid up in reserve in 1937. They were a great disappointment to those who supported the outdated concept of a fleet escort. Although full of interesting innovations, the design showed no appreciation of time experience. They were saved from the scrapheap by the Second World , but they continued to earn a bad name for unreliability A measure of desperation was the conversion to cargo-carriers in 1942-43, but they were equally unsuited to that task. They were decommissioned before the end of hostili­ties, unniourned and unloved.

The next variant was the one-off If4 (SM-1) which was conceived as a 2700-ton hybrid nvnclaycr/cruiscr submarine, capable of laying 60 Mk XI mines through stern-chutes, and armed with two hin guns. Renamed Argonaut in February 1931 (her allocated hull number SS­166 was never official), she was never regarded as successful. Although this may have been in part reflected her operators' lack of familiarity with the complex nunelaying gear, she was too underpowered, and never reached her designed speed of l5kts (13.65kts was all she could manage on trials). She was also too large to be used as a fleet submarine, lacking manoeuvra­bility.

The USS Argonaut was to receive new engines in 1941 but the outbreak of in Decem­ber 1941 caused the modernisation to be postponed.This was eventually done at Mare Island Navy Yard, however, but before she could leave Pearl Harbor for a long-range patrol she was hurriedly converted to a transport Submarine (APS-1) capable of transporting 120 marines. She took part in the raid on the Makin Islands in 1942, with reasonable success, and was then sent to Australia. 5he suffered the misfortune to be sunk by Japanese escorts near New Britain on 10 January 1943, with the loss of 105 officers and men.

The next batch of so-called'13s', V-.5 and V-6, resembled Argonaut but without the minelay­ing capability, compensated for by two stern 21 in torpedo tubes aft, in addition to the four bow tubes. Named Nanu,haf (SF-8) and Nautilus (SF-9), they were given new hull numbers SC-1 and SC-2 in 1925, and shortly after they were commissioned in 1930 they were given new names and numbers: Narwhal (SS-167) and Narui(us (SS-168). Like V-4 they were mediocre, slow to dive, clumsy underwater, and easy to detect. Once again they proved unable to match their designed speed of 17.44kts, achieving a maximum of 14kts on trials. They were due to be re­engined in 1940-41 but the outbreak of prevented the work being done, although Nautilus was fitted with tankage for 19,000 gallons of aviation fuel, in order to refuel seaplanes. She entered Mare Island NavyYard in July 1941 for re-engining, and Nanuhal had a similar overhaul a year later. Both were converted to transport submarines, and served until the end of the in August 1945.

The V-7 ((SC-3) marked a retreat from giant submarines, and although still classified as a submarine cruiser, was closer to the later standard `fleet' submarines which inflicted so much destruction on ,Japanese ship shipping maritime marine engineeringping. While still under construction she was renamed Dolphin (SS­169) and this time her designer, Andrew I McKee, proved that the US Navy -would get better value from a smaller submarine, without sacrificing armament or habitability. She had no trou­ble in reaching hr designed surface speed of 17kts, and operated in the Pacific from 1933. Unfortunately she was never anything but a prototype, being one-of-a-kind with many non­standard items of equipment. For that reason she was regarded as not worth the cost of modernisation, and for most of 1943 was used at Pearl Harbor to train submarine crews. She was sent back to Mare island for 'patch repairs' and passed an to Portsmouth Navy Yard. She continued to serve as a training boat at the New London submarine base with a depth-restric­tion of 150ft, for the rest of the .

The V-8 class marked a$nal retreat from the old-fashioned `fleet' or cruiser submarines so